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ROBERT L. HAUsSER*
From the standpoint of procedu~re, should the United States
Supreme Court be required to vote at least six-three on con-
stitutional issues?
A frequent suggestion among the schemes that would curb
the power of the Supreme Court of the United States to nullify
Congressional Acts is the proposal to limit the power of the
Court to do so except by a concurrence of at least six judges.'
* Legislative Drafting Bureau of Columbia University.
1 The Supreme Court has invalidated eleven Federal laws by five-to-four
decisions: Ex Parte Garland (1867), 4 Wallace 333, i8 L. Ed. 366 (Test
Oath statute applicable to persons already admitted to the Bar); Pollock v.
Farmers' Loa=; & Trust Co. (,895), 158 U.S. 6oi, 39 L. Ed. iio8, i5 S.
Ct. 9x2 (Income Tax law); Fairbank v. United States (i9oi), 1Si U.S. 283,
45 L. Ed. 86z, z1 S. Ct. 648 (Tax on export bills of lading); Employers'
Liability Cases (i9o8), 207 U.S. 463, 52 L. Ed. 297, 28 S. Ct. 141 (Liabil-
ity on interstate employers for injuries of employees); Hammer v. Dagenhart
(1918), 247 U.S. 251, 6z L. Ed. 1101, 38 S. Ct. 529 (Prohibition on inter-
state shipments from factories where child labor employed); Eisner v. Ma-
comber (i92o), 252 U.S. i89, 64 L. Ed. 521, 40 S. Ct. 189 (Income tax
on salaries of Federal judges); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Steward (i92o), Z53
U.S. 149, 64 L. Ed. 834, 40 S. Ct. 438 (Application of State compensation
laws to maritime injuries); Newberry v. United States (1921), 256 U.S. Z32,
65 L. Ed. 913, 41 S. Ct. 469 (Senatorial campaign expneditures); Burnett v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co. (1932), 285 U.S. 393, 76 L. Ed. 8I5, 5z S. Ct.
443 (Taxation of income of State lands); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton
Ry. Co. (i935) 295 U.S. 330, 79 L. Ed. 1468, 55 S. Ct. 758 (Railroad
Retirement Act); Askton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement District
(1936), 298 U.S. 513, 8o L. Ed. 1309, 56 S. Ct. 892 (Municipal Bank-
ruptcy Act). And by five-to-three decisions: United States v. Moreland
(192), 258 U.S. 433, 66 L. Ed. 700, 42 S. Ct. 368 (Jurisdiction of the
juvenile court of District of Columbia); Adkins v. Children's Hospital
(1923), 261 U. S. 525, 67 L. Ed. 785, 4-3 S. Ct. 394 (Minimum wage for
women in District of Columbia). At least six judges have concurred in all
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Such a plan would give a more positive assurance that the
Supreme Court will resolve all doubts of validity in favor of
the statute.
But, may this result be accomplished by statute? Would it
eliminate any real evil in our Federal system? These questions
raise the problem of whether Congress has the power to change
the voting ratio within the Court to arrive at certain decisions.
And, even should this power be admitted, would it be wise to
require the Supreme Court to uphold every Congressional Act
unless six justices concurred in opposing it?
The answers are necessarily inconclusive because Congress
has never attempted such limitation, nor has the Supreme Court
ever openly committed itself on the subject.2 One must speak,
therefore, in terms of analogies from the attempts of the States
to regulate voting ratios within their own courts.
Although, throughout our national history, decisions by the
State courts have aroused State legislators to attempt to check
the veto prerogative of the courts, summary inquiries reveal no
State legislature that has declared by statute a change in the
voting requirements of its supreme court before it could invali-
date a law. The voters of three States have effected the change
by amendments to their constitutions.' An answer to the first
question, therefore, is still speculative. But judicial practice in
the three States that have limited the voting power of their
supreme courts has been extensive enough to permit reasonable
other cases holding Acts of Congress invalid. Cf. Culp, "A Survey of Pro-
posals to Limit or Deny the Power of Judicial Review by the Supreme Court
of the United States" (i929), 4 Indiana L. J. 386; Norton, "The Supreme
Court's Five-to-Four Decisions" (923), 9 A.B.A.J. 417; R. E. Cushman,
"Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the Court" (i92i), i9
Mich. L. R. 771.
2 Cf. United States v. Kleit (1871), 13 Wallace 128, 20 L. Ed. 519,
and Fite, Katherine B., and Rubenstein, Louis B., "Curbing the Supreme
Court-State ExTeriences and Federal Proposals" (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev.
762.
a Ohio Constitution, art. IV, sec. z, adopted i9iz; North Dakota Consti-
tution, art. IV, sec. 89, adopted i918; Nebraska Constitution, art. V, sec. 2,
adopted 192i ; a similar proposal in 1914 was not approved by the voters of
M11innesota.
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conclusions as to how effectively such amendments have solved
the undemocratic result of a decision by a bare majority of the
highest court nullifying a law that might possibly have been
passed by a unanimous legislature and approved by all the
justices in the lower courts. This study will classify the deci-
sions under the three State constitutions to enable one to ap-
praise a similar check upon the Federal courts.
OHIO
Only after stubborn resistance did the General Assembly of
Ohio retreat before the advance of the doctrine of judicial
supremacy in lawmaking. The Constitution of 1803' niggardly
provided:
The judges of the supreme court . . . shall be appointed by a joint
ballot of both houses of the general assembly, and shall hold their offices
for the term of seven years, if so long they behave well.
And Salmon P. Chase, in commenting in 1833 upon the allot-
ment of authority among the three branches of Ohio govern-
ment, wrote:
The judicial department has power enough; but, is not, perhaps,
sufficiently secured in the independent and unbiased exercise of that
power.5
This "judicial insecurity" in Ohio became evident soon after
the decision in Marbury v. Madison' when the Ohio judges
likewise for the first time attempted to declare a State law
unconstitutional. An act of 1805,' defining the jurisdiction of
the justices of the peace, had empowered the local magistrates
(sitting without a jury) to hear civil cases involving more than
$2o,8 and prohibited a plaintiff from recovering costs in actions
Art. III, Sec. 8-Chase, Salmon P., Statutes of Ohio (Cincinnati: Corey
& Fairbank, 1833), p. 79.
' Chase, Statutes of Ohio, p. 35; cf. William T. Utter, "Judicial Review
in early Ohio," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XIV, p. 3.
6 (1803) I Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60.
7 3 Ohio Laws (1804-5), p. 14.
, Id. Sec. 5.
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commenced by original writ from the Court of Common Pleas
for amounts between $20 and $502
Judge Calvin Pease of the Common Pleas and Justices
Huntington and Tod, comprising a majority of the Supreme
Court, promptly held both sections void, not alone because the
Ohio Constitution declared the right of trial by jury to be
inviolate,1" but also because the Seventh Amendment of the
national Constitution provided that in Common Law actions
involving more than $20 the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved [! ]. Moreover, Judge Pease frequently intimated
the power of the Supreme Court to suspend other legislation. 1
The representatives of the Assembly promptly impeached
Pease and Tod 12 for this high-handed attack on the Legislature.
The Senators, sitting as the High Court of Impeachment, tried
Judge Tod first. He pleaded the purity of his convictions, and
was unanimously acquitted. Pease too was absolved, but only
after a vote of fifteen for his conviction and nine for acquittal-
barely short of the two-thirds vote necessary for ouster.
Constiutional Convention of 1912.
This early distrust of the judiciary was revived in the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1912 when the Progressives sought
eagerly to check the conservatism of the courts in invalidating
legislative acts'--a power which, incidentally, was expressly
recognized in neither the Constitution of 18o3 nor that of 18 5 I.
Thus, on April 3, 1912, Chairman John W. Peck of the Judic-
iary Committee submitted proposal 184, that no Act of the
0 Id. Sec. 29.
10 Constitution of ISo3, Art. I, Sec. 8. The case was Rutherford v. 111c-
Faddon, reported in Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Mercury, Nov. 3 and 1o,
1807.
" Chase, Statutes of Ohio, p. 39.
12 No action was taken as to Huntington, who meanwhile had resigned
and had been elected governor. Cf. F. R. Auman, "The Course of Judicial
Review in the State of Ohio" (1931) 25 American Political Science Review
367.
ia Palfrey, John G., "The Constitution and the Courts" (19 13) 26 Harv.
L. Rev. 507.
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Assembly shall be declared void except by concurrence of all
the judges of the Supreme Court."4
The Bar Association wailed in disapproval 5 and forwarded
the reason that a minority on the Supreme Court would be able
to control a decision on constitutional questions. To allow a
minority of the Court to sway the decision would be undemo-
cratic! In answer to the Bar Association, one delegate remarked:
I take it that we are not met here to please the bar association, but
to adopt a judicial system which will be beneficial to the whole people.' 6
The champions of proposal 184, to require unanimous con-
currence of the Court before it could void a statute, advocated
legislative supremacy in State government. The following
counterpoint was typical during the Convention:
Mr. Jones: "Suppose you have a case in the common pleas court
where the common pleas judge holds a law unconstitutional, and the
court of appeals also holds the law unconstitutional. Now you go to the
supreme court of six judges, and five of them declare it unconstitutional.
Do you think it the right thing to let that one man in the supreme court
defeat the judgment of the five members of the supreme court, the three
circuit judges and the common pleas judge?"
Mr. Alnderson: "You didn't start back far enough. Where did the
act come from?' 7
Later, it was suggested that in case of the inability of the
Supreme Court to agree, the decision of the Court of Appeals
should stand.'"
The first amendment was offered by Mr. Peck, who pro-
posed that constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court need
not be unanimous if the Court of Appeals should declare the
statute void." A second amendment would have allowed the
14'2 Proceedings and Debates, Constitutional Convention of the State of
Ohio I141 (1912).
'
5 Id. io28 f.
18 From Stene, Edwin 0., "Is There Minority Control of Court Deci-
sions in Ohio?" (I935) 9 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 23.
" Proceedings and Debates, Constitutional Convention of the State of
Ohio 0go (i9iz).
I8 Id. pp. 1127-28.
19 Id. p. 11+1.
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Supreme Court to declare a law invalid upon a concurrence by
all but one of the seven justices.
The provision as finally enacted was a combination of the
first and second amendments:
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in
the aflfirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law
unconstitutional and void.2"
The most cogent justification in support of this hybrid
limitation, in addition to the instinctive desire to check the
uncontrolled powers of the judges, lay in the movement to give
litigants one trial and an opportunity for a single, but final,
appellate review. It is nonsense to permit a disappointed suitor
to run his case up the hierarchy of courts. The chances for a
persistent party are great that one of the courts of review will
change the decision. A poor litigant may be financially unable
to defend his judgment through the course of appeal. In many
cases the delay itself in granting relief thwarts justice. Hence,
the movement for "one trial, one review.))
Mr. Peck, author of the original proposal i84, agreed:
The great thing which we are after is having the intermediate court
of appeals a court of final jurisdiction in all ordinary cases. 2'
Under this new arrangement, the litigants might hold their
trial in a Common Pleas Court or in a court of first instance
created by the Legislature." The Courts of Appeals, at least
one term to be held annually in each of the 88 counties, would
have complete power of judicial review. And, except for an
enumerated list of cases, their decisions would be final. 3
20 Ohio Constitution, art. IV, sec. 2 (adopted Sept. 3, 1912). Since 1912
the Supreme Court has comprised seven judges. Everett P. Wheeler of New
York, in "The New Constitution of Ohio" (Dec. 13, 1912) 75 Central Law
journal 437, roundly criticized the Amendment as an attack on the independ-
ence of the judiciary. However, Wheeler denounced every other major action
of the Convention.
21 2 Proceedings and Debates, Constitutional Convention of the State of
Oio 1141 (I912).
22 Ohio Constitution, art. IV, secs. 1, 3, 4.
23 Id. art. IV, sec. 6: "The courts of appeals shall have .. .appellate
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Thus, in a case involving the constitutionality of a statute,
the presiding judge in the Common Pleas may without restraint
declare the Act invalid. District Courts of Appeals, intended
as the final courts of review in most cases, can likewise uphold
or invalidate a statute by a bare majority of their membership.
Such a decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court. But,
consonant with its limited jurisdiction in other cases,"4 the Su-
preme Court can overturn a decision of a Court of Appeals
upholding a statute only by concurrence of at least six of the
seven judges. If a Court of Appeals has declared a law uncon-
stitutional, then the highest body can affirm that judgment by
a bare majority vote."
jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases, and, to review, affirm, modify, or
reverse the judgments of the courts of common pleas, superior courts and other
courts of record within the district as may be provided by law, and judgments
of the courts of appeals shall be final ip all cases, except cases involving ques-
tions arising under the constitution of the United States or of this state, cases
of felony, cases of which it has original jurisdiction, and cases of public or
great general interest in which the supreme court may direct any court of
appeals to certify its record to that court" (adopted Sept. 3, 191 z).
24Id. art. IV, sec. z: The Supreme Court "shall have . . . appellate
jurisdiction in all cases involving questions arising under the constitution of the
United States or of this state, in cases of felony on leave first obtained, and in
cases which originated in the courts of appeals, and such revisory jurisdiction
of the proceedings of administrative officers as may be conferred by law"
(adopted Sept. 3, 19IZ).
25 This system positively forces the judiciary in Ohio to resolve all doubts
in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. For example (i) the Act will be
declared valid even if the Common Pleas judge, all three judges of a Court
of Appeals, and three justices of the Supreme Court believe the law uncon-
stitutional, so long as four justices of the Supreme Court hold otherwise; the
case is similar in all 48 states. But, unlike the procedure in the other states,
there are now three situations in Ohio requiring abnormal majorities to
invalidate a statute. (z) An Ohio law will fall (ultimately) only if both a
majority of two of a Court of Appeals and a majority of four members of the
Supreme Court, six of the seven justices must concur in voiding the statute;
bare majority of the highest court have voted against it, despite how tho
intermediate court of appeal has ruled. (3) If a majority of two members of
an Ohio Court of Appeals have upheld the Act, then it requires six of the
s ven Supreme Court justices to overturn the decision; in 45 other states, a
bare majority of the highest court could effect the same result. (4) If a
statute is challenged in a case heard in the original jurisdiction of the Ohio
Supreme Court vote against the Act; in 4.5 other states the Act will fall if a
in 45 other jurisdictions, a bare majority of the court could so rule.
Hence, in any proceeding, to have an Ohio law declared unconstitutional
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Nevertheless it is obvious that the chances for a statute to
be held void may vary according as to how the Court of Appeals
ruled, as from which Court of Appeals the case has been carried,
and as to whether the issue was tried in the original, or appel-
late, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
(I) Courts of Appeals are designed as the intermediate
courts in Ohio; in a few subjects they have concurrent original
jurisdiction. From the discussion in footnote 25, dealing with
cases coming to the Supreme Court on appeal, one will readily
see how five members of the Supreme Court may be consistent
year after year in believing X-statute to be invalidi yet whether
they can give effect to that belief depends on what the court
below has done.
(2) There are nine Courts of Appeals.2" One Court of
Appeals might uphold X-statute, so that the five Supreme
Court judges who consistently oppose the X-statute must see
their tribunal rule in favor of the Act. Is this decree binding
on all appellate districts, and for all time? Or, may a second
Court of Appeals overthrow the statute, so as to allow the five
Supreme Court justices now to affirm its invalidity? Also, may
a new set of judges on the first Court of Appeals disregard the
prior decision and decide against the X-statute, thus to set up
a straw-man for the five superior judges?
(3) Does the restriction in the Ohio Constitution violate
any guarantee in the Federal Constitution?
(4) Does Art. IV, Sec. 2 limit the Supreme Court in cases
tried within its original jurisdiction? If so, then if a litigant,
bringing mandamus, must rely on the validity of X-statute to
succeed in his action, would he not be more wise to invoke the
original mandamus jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, rather
than commence suit in a lower tribunal, which (a) might hold
the lawyer must convince at least six of the ten judges of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals. A democratic answer to the Bar Association of
1912. In all other jurisdictions, the number will be fewer. Quaere, how is
the Indiana Supreme Court to rule on an Ohio law?
0" Throckmorton ' Ohio General Code (June 1937), Appendix, title IV,
ch. I, sec. 14227 (effective July zz, 1935).
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the statute unconstitutional so as (b) to allow a bare majority
of the Supreme Court to affirm the decision?
(5) In certain proceedings the Constitution and the Gen-
eral Assembly have authorized appeals to the Supreme Court
direct "7 from order of administrative boards. Where a board
has recognized the validity of a statute, and an appeal is taken,
must at least six judges of the Supreme Court concur before
voidin gthe act? What if the board had nullified the statute?
(6) Is a municipal ordinance or a ruling of a board a
"law" within the meaning of Art. IV, Sec. 2? May the Supreme
Court invalidate an ordinance only by an abnormal majority?
Or, can the Court void it by a bare majority?
(7) Is the Supreme Court likewise restricted when it votes
in an "advisory" opinion in a criminal case (Ohio G.C. Sec.
13446-4)?
The constitutional cases arising since 1912 have answered
almost all the problems.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has followed a muddled
practice when it decides constitutional cases on appeal.
The case of Barker et al. v. City of Akron (Apr. 2, 1918),
98 Ohio St. 446, 121 N.E. 646, was the first real test of the
voting restriction. The Court of Appeals for Summit County
had sustained Ohio G.C. Sec. 50522" requiring the expenses of
conducting both general and special elections to be borne by the
county treasurer as other county expenses. In proceeding on
errors four Supreme Court justices believed the statute uncon-
stitutional. But because three justices did not deem the section
violative of any constitutional restriction, the Court was forced
to affirm the decision of the appellate division.
The next constitutional case brought on an appeal to the
Supreme Court presented the opposite situation contemplated
27 Ohio Constitution, art. IV, sec. 2; Ohio G. C. (June 1937) secs. 551-6.
'8 Now Sec. 4785-zo.
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by Art. IV. In Patten v. The Aluminum Castings Co. (May
i6) 1922), 105 Ohio St. I, 136 N.E. 426, the plaintiff Patten,
while employed by the defendant Casting Co. in painting its
building, sued for injuries sustained from a fall from a scaffold,
which plaintiff alleged had been negligently erected by
defendant.
In its defense, the Casting Co. denied the right of Patten
to sue in the Common Pleas. Rather, he should be limited to
recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for both
parties conceded that the defendant had complied with Ohio
G.C. Sec. 1465-69, allowing it to become a self-insurer and
thus restrict the injured employee's damages to a statutory
schedule.
Yet, according to Art. II, Sec. 35 of the Constitution, the
employee was not to be limited to this statutory rate if the
employer has failed "to comply with any lawful requirement
for the protection of the lives, health and safety of employees."
And Patten claimed that the defendant had not complied with
every "lawful requirement" because the defendant's negligence
constituted a violation of Ohio G.C. Sec. 12593, which imposes
imprisonment or a fine on an employer supplying "defective
scaffolding." In answer, the Casting Co. denied that Sec. 12593
was one of those "lawful requirements" in the contemplation
of Art II, Sec. 35.
Recovery for $8,750 in the Common Pleas was reversed by
the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.29 The appellate
court ruled only that Sec. 12593 was not to be regarded as one
of the "lawful requirements" of Art. II, Sec. 35. It discussed
nothing of the constitutionality of Sec. 12593. The Supreme
Court affirmed the decision for the defendant, by a vote of
five-to-two."
" (July I, 192o), 13 0. App. I88, 31 O.C.C. (N.S.) 481.
30 Judge Jones, whose opinion was first, voted for the defendant since he
believed Sec. I2593 (punishing a man criminally for negligent raising of
defective scaffolding) to contain too indefinite standards to impose criminal
liability. Hence Sec. 12593 is void and cannot be considered one of the
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The third situation for a case on review: In Morton v. State
of Ohio (July 5, 1922), 105 Ohio St. 366, 138 N.E. 45, the
Supreme Court deemed itself able, by concurrence of six judges,
to declare an act unconstitutional after it had been upheld in
a Court of Appeals. James Morton had been indicted for
robbery and was confined in jail on account of his inability to
furnish bail. He petitioned the trial court to be allowed to go
to Chicago to attend the deposing of his material witnesses. But
the judge refused, because Ohio G.C. Sec. 13668 did not allow
defendants who were confined in jail to attend the taking of
depositions outside the State, although it permitted a defendant
not confined in jail to do so. A conviction was affirmed in the
Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, and the Supreme Court
brought error.
"lawful requirements," the violation of which enables an injured plaintiff to
sue for unrestricted damages in a trial court. Only Judges Matthias and Rob-
inson concurred in the opinion.
Justice Hough concurred in the judgment, but on the theory that Sec.
12593 was not one of those "lawful requirements" contemplated by art. II,
sec. 35. He expressed no view on the constitutionality of Sec. I 2593. Indeed,
Judge Hough carefully noted: "I know of no reason by which the constitu-
tionality of the act can be assailed. The argument is made that if the statute
is not available to Patten in this case, it must be unconstitutional. This is
no true. A law may be in harmony with various provisions of the constitution,
and yet fail to be operative, or enforceable, or applicable to a given situation."
Chief Justice Marshall also concurred in the judgment, but "solely upon the
ground that there is no evidence shown by the record to support the verdict
and judgment" for the plaintiff, although, it is true, he made a totally unwar-
ranted dictum that Sec. I2593 was unconstitutional.
Carl L. Meier, in "Power of the Ohio Supreme Court to Declare Laws
Unconstitutional" (1931) 5 U. of Cinn. L. R. 293, at p. 299, hence says
Sec. 12593 "was held null and void by a bare majority of the court on the
ground that it was indefinite and general in its requirements." In view of
the above analysis of the opinions of the majority decision, I must disagree
with Meier. At best only three judges-Jones, Matthias and Robinson-held
Sec. 12593 to be void; and even then they did not expressly state such a view.
The other four judges either held Sec. 12593 constitutional or contended its
validity not to be at issue (i.e., Marshall). Patten v. Aluminum Co., therefore,
is not an apt illustration of the operation of the limitation on the Ohio judi-
ciary. This case was overruled by dictum of Judge Allen in Sprinkler v.
Fender (1923), io8 Ohio St. 149, 141 N.E. 269; in 1923 art. II, sec. 35
of the Ohio Constitution was amended so as to substitute the words "specific
requirement" for the words "lawful requirement."
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Four judges of the Supreme Court3 voted for reversal of
the conviction on the holding that, to allow a defendant not in
jail to view deposition of witnesses examined outside the State
but to deny this privilege to defendants held in jail, was a denial
of the equal protection clause of Art. I, Sec. 2 of the Ohio Con-
stitution. These four judges would not alone have constituted
a majority sufficient to reverse the judgment on the ground of
the invalidity of Sec. 13668. Chief Justice Marshall dissented
without comment. Judges Wanamaker and Johnson volun-
teered their uncalled-for remark that Sec. 13668 denied equal
protection, but then voted to affirm the conviction since Mor-
ton's original petition to the trial court was defective in that it
did not show the purported witnesses in Chicago to be those
"whose attendance cannot be had at the trial."32
The first four judges seized upon the dictume of Wana-
maker and Johnson and announced that they had the requisite
six votes to declare Sec. 13668 invalid.
Does this case support the proposition that if six justices
venture their opinion as to the unconstitutionality of a statute,
then the trial courts are bound to ignore the act? If so, the
Constitutional check on the voting power of the Supreme Court
has been eaten into by this unforeseen interpretation.3 3
The fourth circumstance: the case of McBride, Treas. v.
White Motor Co. (Dec. 12, 1922), io6 Ohio St. 656, 140
N.E. 942, introduced a new obstacle to the attempts of the
Supreme Court to invalidate a statute affirmed in the court
below. Art. IV, Sec. 2 requires a "concurrence of at least all
"1 Robinson, Hough, Jones, and Matthias.
32 io5 Ohio St. 366, at 381.
33 In my opinion, the conviction should have been sustained, by a vote of
three-to-four, with an opportunity of appeal to the United States Supreme
Court on the ground of a denial of equal protection under the Federal Con-
stitution. I believe the more cautious observance of the distinction between
holding and dictum led to a more logical result in Fullwood v. Canton (I 927),
116 Ohio St. 732, 158 N.E. I7I, discussed infra p. 35.
Sec. 13668 was repealed in 1929; now Sec. 13444-11 contains the pro-
visions in unobjectionable form.
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but one of the judges"; hence, if any two justices should be
incapacitated or should disqualify themselves, the remaining
judges may be unanimous in believing the statute invalid, yet
must affirm its constitutionality. In the McBride case, review-
ing the validity of Ohio G.C. Sec. 5327 upheld by a Court of
Appeals, three justices disqualified themselves. It was impos-
sible for the remaining members to declare the Act uncon-
stitutional."4
Again five members of the Supreme Court were unable to
void a statute because of a favorable decision of the Court of
Appeals below, in Shook et al. v. Mahoning Valley Sanitary
District (Mar. 27, 1929), 12o Ohio St. 449, i66 N.E. 415.
Although an outspoken critic of "minority" court decisions,"
Chief Justice Marshall did not hesitate to concur with Judge
Day in overriding the view of his five associates."
34 The constitutional dispute had arisen over the declaration in Sec. 5327
that accrued debts might be credited against earnings in computing net income
of a corporation for taxation purposes; were accrued taxes owing to the
Federal government thus deductible?
Sec. 5327 now forbids the taxpaying corporation from deducting the
taxes payable to the United States from the net credits to be taxed by Ohio.
The old section, as amended on March 6, 1923 (I IO O.L. 23) to reverse the
confused interpretation of the McBride case, was upheld in Tax Commission
of Ohio v. National Malleable Castings Co. (June 21, I924), I1 Ohio St.
117, 144 N.E. 604, five judges believing it constitutional. A second amend-
ment, effective on July I8, 1933 (I 15 O.L. 548), altered other provisions of
the section.
In Royal Green Coach Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (April i,
i924), IIO Ohio St. 41, 143 N.E. 547, a statute was upheld although five
judges believed it void. Wanamaker, J., did not participate; infra, p. 34.
"' The Court of Appeals for Mahoning County had upheld the validity
of Ohio G. C. secs. 66o2-34 to 66oz-io6, authorizing the creation of the
Mahoning Valley Sanitary District to supply water to Youngstown and Niles.
36 Cf. his opinion in Board of Education v. Columbus (1928), 11S Ohio
St. 295, 16o N.E. 9o2, infra, p. z5.
3 An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed without
discussion in Gottlieb v. Mahoning Valley Sanitary District et al. (April 14,
1930), 281 U.S. 770, 74 L. Ed. 1177, 50 S.C. 333- In State ex rel. Bryant
v. Akron Park District (1930), I2o Ohio St. 464, 166 N.E. 407, the votes of
Marshall and Kinkade were likewise able to negative the dissenting votes of
the remaining five justices, infra, p. 27.
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II
Since the judgment of the Supreme Court is influenced by
what a Court of Appeals has decided, the problem arises
whether a statute, upheld by the Supreme Court by a subnormal
majority because of a favorable holding of one intermediate
court, will bind the courts in other appellate districts, or even
the trial courts in the district where the original case arose. Ohio
judges have faced these procedural difficulties in ruling on two
statutes.
This cloud shadowed the fate of Ohio G.C. Sec. 1465-742'
In De W!itt et al. v. The State ex rel. Crabbe, Att. General
(Nov. 13, 1923), io8 Ohio St. 513, 141 N.E. 551, the Su-
preme Court reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals for
Fayette County" holding the 5o% penalty provision of this
statute constitutional."0 Five judges believed the fine a violation
of Art. I, Sec. 16 of the Ohio Constitution. But since two jus-
tices voted in favor of the penalty, the Court was forced to
recognize Sec. 1465-74 as valid, at least for the Second Appel-
late District."'
Did this minority decision set a binding precedent on the
trial courts? In 1927, in a similar penalty proceeding by the
State before the Hamilton County Common Pleas (First Ap-
pellate District), trial-Judge Darby was asked to recognize the
',Ohio G. C. See. 1465-74 provided that when the Industrial Commis-
sion has awarded a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the amount
of the award shall be paid by the employer within ten days after receiving
notice; in the event of the failure or refusal of the employer to pay within
the ten-day period, the award shall become a claim for liquidated damages,
which, with an added penalty of 5oo, may be collected in an action brought
by the State on behalf of the person entitled.
31 In the Second Appellate District.
4o The employers, De Witt were ordered penalized 5o% of the award
of the Industrial Commission for their having refused to pay the claim on
the ground that they were not the employers of the deceased.
41 Cf. 39 A.L.R. i 8 in, "Constitutionality of statute penalizing unsuc-
cessful appeal to courts from action of administratiev board"; and 43 A.L.R.
335, at 365, "Independence of contract considered with relation to scope
and construction of statutes."
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validity of Sec. I465-74" Instead, after remarking that "but
for the manner in which the De Witt case reached the Supreme
Court, the decision of the court would have been to the con-
trary,"4 he proceeded to declare the penalty clause unconstitu-
tional. His only justification was the opinion of the five
minority judges. The State did not appeal.44
The 50% penalty provision in Ohio G.C. Sec. 1465-74
reached its finale in State, for Benefit of Bredwell et al. v.
Hershner et al. (Apr. i8, 19 28), 118 Ohio St. 555, i61 N.E.
334. The dependant of a deceased employee, having received
a compensation award from the Industrial Commission, sued
in the Common Pleas of Butler County for judgment and
for the 50% penalty for failure of the employer and his
receiver to pay within ten days. A judgment for both items
was reversed in the Court of Appeals (First Appellate Dis-
trict, one reason being that the penalty was unconstitutional."
On error to the Supreme Court, six judges affirmed the inval-
idity of the penalty."
42 State of Ohio, ex rel. C. C. Crabbe, Att. General v. J. F. Crawford
(Mar., 1927), 26 O.N.P. (N.S.) 519.
43 Id. at 520.
44 Although the possible correctness of Judge Darby's conclusion may be
conceded, I believe his reasoning is unfortunate. In order to have allowed
himself freedom to examine the constitutionality of the statute de novo, Judge
Darby might have recalled that the power of the Supreme Court was shorn
in 1912 so as to make each "court of appeals a court of final jurisdiction in
all ordinary cases." (Proceedings and Debates 1141.) Hence, the Supreme
Court decision in the De Witt case was directed to affirming the Court of
Appeals of the Second Appellate District alone, and the courts in the First
Appellate District should be still free to decide for themselves. On the other
hand, for a trial court blindly to follow the minority opinion of the Supreme
Court as authority is to nullify the program of the Convention of 1912, how-
ever illogical it may have been. Judge Darby's logic was criticized by his
colleague, Bell, J., of the same court, in Michaelson v. Cincinnati (1928),
27 O.N.P. (N.S.) oo, at IoI, infra, p. 39n.
" In this case, Antenem, Rear. v. The State, ex rel. Bredwell et al. (June
10, 1927), 27 Ohio App. 4, 16o N.E. 637, Hamilton, P. J., dismissed the
statute with the bare statement: ". . . we are of the opinion that that part
of the act was unconstitutional and void."
46 Aff'd. in The State, ex rel. Davis v. Industrial Commission of Ohio
(Apr. 18, I928), 118 Ohio St. 340, 161 N.E. 32.
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This majority was large enough to control a case coming
from any appellate district. Quaere, if the Supreme Court had
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for Butler County
by a vote of only five-to-two, would this Hershner case bind
the judiciary of the Second Appellate District (Fayette
County)? In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals of
Fayette County in the De Witt case, supra, a five-to-two ma-
jority would be ineffective." How else can we give logical
effect to the expression of the Convention of 19 12?
The history of Ohio G.C. Sec. 3963 witnessed a similar
disregard of one Court of Appeals for the two-to-five decision
of the Supreme Court affirming the decision of another Court
of Appeals. Sec. 3963 requires municipalities operating their
water utility to furnish water free to the public school buildings
in the corporate limits. Despite this order, the City of East
Cleveland sought payment from the local Board of Education
for service, but was denied relief both in the Common Pleas
of Cuyahoga County and in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Appellate District, which upheld the statute challenged by the
city as unconstitutional." On error, Justices Jones and Day
constitute a "majority" sufficient to affirm the judgment below;
Marshall, Matthias, Allen, Kinkade and Robinson were an inef-
fective dissent (City of East Cleveland v. Board of Education
of City School Dist. of East Cleveland (May 26, 1925), 112
Ohio St. 607, 148 N.E. 35o)."
The next year the City of East Cleveland tried again to
47 Sec. 1465-74 Gen. Code has since been amended (effective July 8,
193) to eliminate the penalty of 50%. The Ohio Constitution, Art. II,
Sec. 35, as amended in 1923, allows the Industrial Commission to assess a
penalty of 5o% where it is found that the injury resulted from failure of
the employer to observe specific safety requirements.
4s East Cleveland v. Board of Education (June z3, 1924), 7 0. L. Abs.
713.
4' The "minority" believed the section in violation of Art. XVIII, Sec. 4
of the Constitution, giving a municipality the power to operate public utilities
and charge for service. Sec. 3963 still stands in the Code (June 1937): "No
charge shall be made by a city . . . for supplying water . . . for the use
of the public school buildings in such city. .... "
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charge the Board for water service, in the hope that Judges
Washburn, Funk and Pardee of the Ninth Appellate District,
who were temporarily sitting for the Eighth Appellate District
(in which East Cleveland is located), would reverse the pre-
vious decision of the Supreme Court. In City of East Cleveland
v. Board of Education of City School Dist. of East Cleveland
(Mar. 28, 1927), 25 Ohio App. 192, 157 N.E. 575, these
visiting judges upheld Sec. 3963 Gen. Code, without citing or
referring to the previous litigation."
Soon after, the City of Columbus sought to test anew the
validity of Sec. 3963. The Court of Appeals of Franklin
County (Second Appellate District) upheld the charge of the
city and struck down the statute.51 Hence, on appeal, the same
five "minority" justices of the East Cleveland case were able
to declare the statute void, at least for the Second District. But,
as to the other districts?5 2
In Newark v. Board of Education (Jan. 9, 193), 28
O.N.P. (N.S.) 297, Judge Moore of the Licking County Com-
mon Pleas (Fifth Appellate District) faced the problem of
resolving the conflicting Supreme Court cases. He sought to
devise a rule-of-thumb for trial judges: the Common Pleas
judge should adopt the view of the latest Supreme Court
decision until the local Court of Appeals has ruled. Applying
this rule, he declared the law invalid for Licking County.
"o Later judges (Cf. Marshall, C. J., in Bd. Education v. City of Colum-
bus (1928), 118 Ohio St. 295, 16o N.E. 9oz) have regarded this decision
of the visiting judges as validating Sec. 3963 in the Ninth Appellate District
because the judges came from the Ninth District. But, do the individual
judges of the Ninth District, sitting in the Eighth District, decide the law
for their home area; or does the Court of the Ninth District set the prece-
dents?
51 Columbus Board of Education v. City of Columbus (Oct. 27, 1927),
6 0. L. Abs. 288.
52 Attorney General Edward C. Turner, in an opinion on May i8, 1928
(O.A.G. 1928, No. 2126), assumed that Sec. 3936 had now been invalidated
for all jurisdictions. On the other hand, his successor, Gilbert Bettman, urged
that the statute be regarded as valid in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Districts until the respective Courts of Appeals
should hold otherwise (August 7, I929, O.A.G. 1929, No. 712).
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The Fourth Appellate District sided with the Second Dis-
trict and with Licking County when, in Board of Education of
Wellston City School District v. City of Wellston (Nov. I,
1932), 43 Ohio App. 552, 184 N.E. 28, the Court of Appeals
for Jackson County nullified the statute, on the theory that it
is the "duty of the Court of Appeals .. . to follow the last
word of the Supreme Court."
In Board of Education of Willard Village v. Village of
Willard (Dec. 4, 1935), 130 Ohio St. 311, I99 N.E. 74, the
Supreme Court ended the whole controversy: six judges" -
sufficient to overrule any type of appeal-affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals for Huron County (Sixth District)
holding the section invalid. 4
III
American lawyers are accustomed (I) to a decision of the
trial court arrived at by the majority of the judges sitting at
the trial; (2) to appellate courts reaching decisions by simple
majority vote; and (3) to an appeal which finally reaches a
single high court, which tends to make the operation of statutes
uniform throughout the state. Insofar as Art. IV, Sec. 2
abridges any of these features, does it violate the Federal
Constitution?
The United States Supreme Court has upheld Art. IV,
Sec. 2, at least in its restriction of No. (2) above, in State of
Ohio, ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District for
Summit County (Mar. 12, 1930), 281 U.S. 74, 74 L. Ed. 710,
50 S.C. 228. Taxpayers in Akron and Cleveland had petitioned
their Common Pleas to enjoin the completion of certain parks
because Ohio G.C. Secs. 2976-I to 2976-Ioi, allowing the local
Probate judge to determine the need for the parks, contained
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. A dismissal
r3Weygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Williams, Matthias, Day, and Zimmer-
m 4 C'f. the acquiescence to this view in 1936 O.A.G. No. 5147, 1936
O.A.G. No. 5655 and 1936 O.A.G. No. 6ooo.
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by the trial courts was affirmed in the Courts of Appeals. The
Supreme Court likewise ratified, but by the "majority" of
two-to-five.55
The petitioner gained a hearing in the United States Su-
preme Court--claiming (a) that the restriction on the voting
power of the Ohio Supreme Court was a denial of a republican
form of government," and of due process," and (b) the result-
ing situation, wherein the statute is often void in some districts
but valid in others, abridges the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Writing for a unanimous court in dismissing the appeal,
Chief Justice Hughes reminded that Congress, not the Supreme
Court, is the proper agency to enforce the guarantee of repub-
lican government. As to denial of an effective appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court, he continued:
• . . it is sufficient to say that, as frequently determined by this
court, the right of appeal is not essential to due process, provided that
due process has already been accorded in the tribunal of first instance.
. . .The opportunity afforded to litigants in Ohio to contest all con-
stitutional and other questions fully in the common pleas court and again
in the court of appeals plainly satisfied the requirement of the Federal
Constitution in this respect and the state was free to establish the limi-
tation in question in relation to appeals to its supreme court in accordance
with its views of state policy."
Hughes did not rule on the objection that a statute may be
void in one district of Ohio, yet constitutional in another:
In invoking the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it is argued that the result of the application of the provision of
the state Constitution may be that the same statute may be constitutional
in a case arising in one county, and unconstitutional in another case
arising in another county. . . . [It] is said that, from the standpoint
of the state Constitution, the statute may operate unequally. . . . In
the present instance, there has been as yet no conflict of decision.55
5 (Mar. 27, 1929) Izo Ohio St. 464, 166 N.E. 407.
5 United States Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 4.
17 Fourteenth Amendment.
58 74 L. Ed. at 715 (italics are mine).
59 74 L. Ed. at 716.
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This decision appears limited, therefore, to the narrow hold-
ing that a litigant cannot complain of denial of due process
where he is able to test all issues fully in the trial court and in
one appellate court.
Questions remaining unanswered: (I) Are residents being
denied equal protection when a statute has been actually held
void for one county and constitutional for another?
(2) Is the restriction on the voting power of the Supreme
Court in an original mandamus action a violation of due process
under the Federal Constitution? Chief Justice Hughes said
only that Art. IV, Sec. 2 does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as "due process has already been accorded
in the tribunal of first instance." But in a petition to the original
jurisdiction of the Ohio Supreme Court (the decision of which
will be controlled by a minority of two members), will the
defendant have the opportunity "to contest all constitutional
and other questions fully?"
(3) Where the litigant appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
from the ruling of an administrative board based on the validity
of a statute, does not Art. IV, Sec. 2 abridge due process in
requiring a concurrence of six judges before the Court can
reverse the order?
IV
The Supreme Court of Ohio has concurrent original juris-
diction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition
and procedendo. ° If the litigants who invoke this original
jurisdiction seek to test the constitutionality of a statute, will
the Supreme Court be forbidden to invalidate the statute except
by a concurrence of six of the seven judges?61
In State, ex rel. Durbin v. Smith, Secretary of State (June
'o Ohio Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2. The Courts of Appeals have identi-
cal jurisdiction: Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 6.
" Cf. 66 A.L.R. 1467n, "Validity and Effect of Provisions Limiting the
Power of Courts to Declare a Statute Unconstitutional."
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i6, i92I), IO2 Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457, William Durbin
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to require
the Secretary of State to take preliminary steps for the holding
of a referendum62 on an act 63 to create a new administrative code.
The. Secretary refused, because the act had been declared an
emergency measure by two-thirds vote of both houses of the
Assembly, hence not subject to referendum.
A majority of four judges concurred in a per curiam
decision. The first half of the opinion contained the belief of
Justices Jones and Matthias that the fact of emergency as
declared by two-thirds vote of the Legislature could not be
reviewed by the Court. Then Justices Jones and Matthias
joined with Judges Hough and Robinson in holding that even
if the Court does have power to inquire into the declaration of
emergency, the Assembly in this case had not acted unrea-
sonably.
Since four justices concurred in the reasonableness of the
emergency, this case, in my opinion, is not an example of two
members overriding the vote of a majority of judges as to the
unconstitutionality of a statute. fn the light of the canon of con-
stitutional construction,6" that a court should never rule on the
constitutionality of a statute if the case can be decided on some
other basis, the statements of Jones and Matthias as to the
voting requirement of the Ohio Court in constitutional cases are
unwarranted dicta.65
62 Ohio Constitution, Art. II, Sec. ic.
63 109 O.L. 105.
64 Cf. opinion of Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority (1936), 297 U.S. z88, 8o L. Ed. 688, 56 S. Ct. 466.
65 Carl L. Meier, however, has included this case as an illustration of the
power of two judges in an original mandamus suit ([1931] 5 U. of Cinn.
L. R. 293, at 298): "Two judges held that the necessity of an emergency
clause could not be reviewed by the courts. For this reason the supreme court
could not declare such clause unconstitutional and order a referendum." My
view, that this case is inconclusive as to the belief maintained by Meier, is
affirmed by Cowen, J., in Burns v. City of Marietta (May 6, x9z9), Common
Pleas of Washington County, 27 O.N.P. (N.S.) 497 at 514.
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In State, ex rel. Williams v. Industrial Commission of Ohio
(Mar. 8, 1927), 116 Ohio St. 45, 156 N.E. IOI, the relator,
an injured employee, invoked the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in mandamus to compel the Industrial Com-
mission to compensate the relator from its surplus fund because
the employer was insolvent. Ohio G.C. Sec. 1465-75 (as
amended March 26, 1925) " orders such payments from a fund
(raised from premiums paid by solvent employers) when the
employer of the injured party is insolvent. Three judges, find-
ing no constitutional objection to the act, granted the peremptory
writ. Four members, in this case a "minority," believed that
forcing solvent business men to pay the debts of their insolvent
competitors is "violative of the due process clause found in
Articles V [!] and XIV of the Amendments to the Federal
Constitution." '
Attorneys Waymon B. McLeskey and Wilbur E. Grabiel
for the relator were wise in commencing the action in the Su-
preme Court. For, if the case had originated in a court of
appeals unsympathetic to the statute, then, on appeal to the
high tribunal, the four dissenting judges above could have con-
trolled the decision and hence denied relief."8
Voting procedure was standardized by the time of State, ex
rel. Jones v. Zangerle, Auditor (Dec. 21, 1927), 117 Ohio St.
507, 159 N.E. 564. One Jones had become Common Pleas
judge of Miami County for a six-year term beginning February
9, 1925. At that time, Ohio G.C. Sec. 2253 authorized a per
diem stipend of $io whenever a judge should be assigned to
xi Ohio Laws 218.
67 116 Ohio St. 45, at 48.
"s Final relief was ordered for the employee in State ex rel. Williams v.
Industrial Commission of Ohio (June 13, 1928), 1i Ohio St. 47, 161 N.E.
486. The case was followed in State, ex rel. Davis v. Industrial Commission
of Ohio (Apr. iS, 1928), 11S Ohio St. 340, 16I N.E. 32, five justices con-
curring. Cf. State v. Industrial Commission of Ohio (Ct. Appls., First App.
Dist., Nov. 30, 1931), 41 Ohio App. 549, 18o N.E. 204, II 0. L. Abs. 611,
where a similar writ of mandamus was sought in the Common Pleas of Hamil-
ton County.
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duty in another county by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. On May i I, 1927 the Legislature amended Ohio G.C.
Sec. 2253 to increase the pay to $2o per day. From September
6, 1927 to October I, 1927 Judge Jones was assigned to Cuya-
hoga County; but Auditor Zangerle refused to warrant him any
more than $io per day, since Art. IV, Sec. 4 of the State Con-
stitution provided that the compensation of a Common Pleas
judge shall be neither increased nor decreased during his exist-
ing term of office; thus Sec. 2253 would be unconstitutional as
applied to Judge Jones. In an original mandamus action to
compel the Auditor to warrant $2o per diem compensation, the
Supreme Court granted relief, although four justices believed
the statute void as applied to the relator. The "majority" of
three members held the limitation in Art. IV, Sec. 14 to apply
only to the measure of annual salary."9
V
What procedure has the Supreme Court devised in deter-
mining constitutional issues on appeals from orders of admin-
istrative boards? Art. IV, Sec. 2 of the Constitution is not
explicit.
The Court has founded a sane answer in such a precedent
as Royal Green Coach Co. v. Pvblic Utilities Commission (Apr.
I, 1924), i1o Ohio St. 41, 143 N.E. 547. On November 14,
1923, the Coach Co. had applied for a certificate of public
convenience-and-necessity to operate a bus line between Dayton
and Oxford via Hamilton, under Ohio G.C. Sec. 614-84, but
was refused in favor of rival operators. On error direct to the
Supreme Court to test the validity of this Act empowering the
Commission to discriminate among applicants, the Court upheld
69 In both this Zangerle case, the East Cleveland case, and the Williams
case the less-than-four judges controlling the final decision wrote the first
opinion. Contrast this with the De Witt case, in which the opinion of the
two members controlling the decision was relegated behind the opinions of
the five ineffective dissenters. Is the Supreme Court muddled in even this
technical point of the arrangement of opinions?
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such power, by an apparent vote of zero-to-five. The Court
had followed the same course as if the Act had been upheld in
a Court of Appeals."0
VI
If you were to drive through a series of safety zones in an
Ohio city, you might soon learn that a municipal ordinance is
law. But, has the Supreme Court considered an ordinance to
be a "law" within the restriction on the voting power of the
Court? Art. IV, Sec. 2 itself sheds no light.71
The first opportunity to decide this question came in Full-
wood v. City of Canton (Mar. 29, 1927), it6 Ohio St. 732,
158 N.E. 171 on error from the Court of Appeals of Stark
County, which had upheld an ordinance of the City of Canton
to provide for the examination and licensing of electricians. The
Court resolved two problems with the views as follows:
(I) Does this ordinance violate any constitutional provision?
Yes No
Allen Jones
Day Matthias
Kinkade
Marshall
Robinson
(2) Is an ordinance a "law" as used in Art. IV, Sec. 2?
No Yes
Jones Allen
Kinkade Day
Marshall Robinson
Matthias
Therefore, the vote on the judgment:
70 The decision was approved in Ohio Valley Transit Co. et al. v. Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio (May 27, 1931), 124 Ohio St. 212, 177 N.E.
593, concurred in by a unanimous court.
71 The United States Supreme Court has held that ordinances are "laws"
of the state within the federal constitutional provision that no state shall pass
any "law" impairing the obligation of contract: New Orleans Water Works
Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co. (i888), 1z5 U.S. I8, 3i L. Ed. 607,
8 S. Ct. 741.
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For affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals:
'Jones f because the ordinance does not violate
Matthias any higher authority.
five Allen because an ordinance is a law within Art.
Day IV, Sec. 2, and therefore their decision
Robinson must necessarily, by the terms of the
Constitution, be conditioned on the fact
that two members of the Court believe
the "law" does not violate any higher
authority.
For reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals:
[because the ordinance violates a consti-
fKinkade tutional guarantee and because an ordi-two Marshall nance does not fall within the meaning
of Art. IV, Sec. 2.
Hence, the Court of Appeals was upheld by a vote of five-to-
two 57 2 there was no holding on whether an ordinance is a "law"
under Art. IV, Sec. 2.
72 Edwin 0. Stene, then Asst. Prof. Political Science, U. of Kansas, in
(1935) 9 U. of Cinn. L. R. 23, criticizes the procedure and judgment of
this case. In his opinion, the judges should first have voted on whether an
ordinance was a "law," and have made this vote binding upon the members
of the Court as bearing on the remainder of the reasoning in this case; then,
with this first point settled, the members should have voted as to whether the
ordinance conflicted with a superior organ. Under this procedure the Court
would have reached a contrary conclusion.
I disagree with Dr. Stene, and concur in the procedure adopted by the
Court. Since Stene would force the judges, in a debated intermediate point
in their reasoning, to settle the point conclusively on all members before pro-
ceeding to the next step, it may be asked: "Would he allow the judges to
record a dissent on the second point, although denying to them the power to
cause their disagreement on the first step to influence their final judgment?"
In reaching their final decision, why should the first step in their reasoning
be any less important than the second step?
The correct view, I submit, is for each judge to reach his final conclusion
upon his own independent value judgments as to intermediate steps. The
only exception is where the Constitution commands otherwise, as in Art. IV,
Seq, 2, which orders the judges to take cognizance of the views of thir
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At last, in 1934, the Supreme Court uttered an opinion
which will probably settle conclusively the problem whether
an ordinance is a "law" within the meaning of Art IV, Sec. 2.
The Court of Appeals for Stark County had declared unconsti-
tutional an ordinance of the Village of Brewster to purchase a
light and power plant on the installment plan. On April II,
brothers and which doctrine Judges Allen, Day and Robinson adhered to in
the Fullwood case. My point of view is illustrated by the voting procedure
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (936), z97 U.S. 288, So L.
Ed. 688, 56 S. Ct. 466, where a majority was formed by judges who reached
their conclusion upon intermediate steps in a complete trend of reasoning.
In F. H. Fuliwood v. City of Canton, Ohio et al. (Oct. 17, 1927), 275
U.S. 484, 7z L. Ed. 386, 48 S. Ct. 31, the United States Supreme Court
dismissed a motion for writ of error because of inadequate showing of a Fed-
eral question. Thus a decision on the validity of Art IV, Sec. z under the
Federal Constitution was temporarily postponed.
A similar split of views in Meyers v. Copelan, Chief of Police (Oct. z6,
1927), 11 7 Ohio St. 622, I6o N.E. 855 for a second time blocked a holding
as to the nature of an ordinance. The Court of Appeals of Hamilton County
had upheld Sec. 845 of the Ordinances of Cincinnati prohibiting public auc-
tions of jewelry. (The petitioner Meyers, a regular jewelry merchant who
desired to auction his stock because his store was to be torn down, had sought
in the Common Pleas of Hamilton County to enjoin the enforcement of the
ordinance as violating the guarantees of Secs. I and i9 of the Ohio Bill of
Rights and the Fifth [!] and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Con-
stitution.) Again Justices Jones, Kinkade, Marshall and Matthias believed an
ordinance not to be a "law" within Art. IV, Sec. z. But this view of the
four judges was dictum. For, Jones, Kinkade and Marshall voted for the
affirmance of the judgment below because they held that this ordinance vio-
lated no constitutional guarantee; and Allen, Day and Robinson (who all
believed the ordinance a violation of fundamental guarantees) concurred
because they believed the restriction in Art IV, Sec. z to cover an ordinance
and because more than one justice was of the opinion that no guarantee was
infringed.
What to make of this decision in the Meyers case confronted Common
Pleas Judge Bell of Hamilton County, the following year, when the same
ordinance was attacked [Harry I. Michaelson v. City of Cincinnati (Apr.
1928), 27 O.N.P. (N.S.) Ioo]. It was suggested to him that since four
justices of the Supreme Court had ineffectually expressed disapproval of the
ordinance, he was bound by that view-just as his colleague Judge Darby, in
the Crawford case, supra p. 20, had followed a previous "minority" opinion
of five Supreme Court justices. Judge Bell balked at this procedure: "If this
court was to follow the opinion of the majority of the judges rather than the
judgment of the court, it would be doing by indirection that which the Con-
stitution prohibits being done." Bell's stand is proper; in effect he reaffirmed
what his Court of Appeals had pronounced and which could not be overturned
by the Supreme Court.
80 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1938
1935, the Supreme Court affirmed this decision by the adequate
majority of five votes (Village of Brewster et al. v. Hill, 128
Ohio St. 343, 19o N.E. 766). The litigation appeared fully
and satisfactorily closed.
But, mirabile dicta, the Court by Justice Jones rendered an
additional "opinion" on June 6, 1934. Admittedly ever since
the Fullwood case the Bar was perplexed as to the constitutional
status of an ordinance. Hence, Jones explained:
[128 Ohio St. at 355] Since the personnel of this court has notably
changed in recent years, counsel indicate that they would like the opinion
of the present bench upon this important question of constitutional
construction.
[at 356] . . . we have complied with the indicated wish of counsel
by giving reconsideration to the question of the constitutional construction
of Section 2, Article IV of the State Constitution, and whether that
section applies to ordinances as well as to statute law.
Whereupon all the justices"' concurred that an ordinance is not
a "law" within Art IV, Sec. 2. This entire opinion was
advisory."'
VII
In 1929 the Assembly ratified the "advisory" jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court." In a criminal case, if the trial judge
rules a point of law against the prosecuting attorney, the latter
may seek a review by the Supreme Court of the disputed
decision. Even if the Supreme Court should disapprove the
ruling of the trial judge, it cannot reverse the final judgment
of the Common Pleas, except on appeals from certain prelimi-
73 Weygandt, C. J., Bevis, Matthias, Stephenson, Wilkin and Zimmerman.
Justices Allen, Day and Robinson, who had controlled the voting in the Full-
wood and Meyer cases, had left the bench.
74 In Wilson v. City of Zanesville (Dec. 18, '935), 130 Ohio St. 286,
i99 N.E. 187, the Court ruled that an ordinance is not a law within Art. II,
Sec. 34 of the Ohio Constitution, providing: "Laws may be passed . . . regu-
lating the hours of labor. .... .
" Ohio G.C. (June, 1937) Secs. 13446-I to 13446-4; formerly Ohio
G.C. Secs. 1368? to 13684.
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nary rulings76 the opinion shall be merely directed upon trial
judges in future cases.
If, therefore, in a criminal proceeding, the Common Pleas
should favor the accused by holding a statute constitutional (or
unconstitutional, as the case may be), and if the prosecutor
should refer the decision to the Supreme Court, will the voting
restriction in Art. IV, Sec. 2 bind the Supreme Court in render-
ing its advisory opinions as to the validity of the disputed
statute?
This situation has precedent in State of Ohio v. Whitnore
(March 29, 1933), 126 Ohio St. 381, 185 N.E. 547.77 The
prosecution appealed from a ruling of the Common Pleas of
Lucas County as to the definiteness of an indictment. The
Supreme Court justices doubted whether such advisory rulings
were violative of the rule against double jeopardy."8 Stephen-
son and Allen, J. J., believed the statute constitutional after
striking out the power of the Supreme Court ever to reverse
the trial court for that particular prosecution." These two
votes negated those of four other justices who regarded the
statute unconstitutional."0
76 In order not to violate Ohio Constitution, Art. I, Sec. Io: "No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
77 This is the latest case which I have found in which a "minority" has
effectively defended the validity of a statute. In (March, 1937), 35 Michigan
L. R. at 776, Fite and Rubenstein (supra p. 2n) wrote: " . . since i928
there have been no minority decisions sustaining legislation in Ohio."
7' Ohio G.C. Sec. 13446-4 states: "If the supreme court is of the opinion
that the questions presented by such bill of exceptions should be decided, it
shall allow the bill of exceptions to be filed and render a decision thereon;
which decision shall not affect the judgment of the court of common pleas
in said cause, nor shall said judgment of the court of common pleas be reversed,
unless the judgment of the supreme court reverses the judgment of the court
of common pleas on its ruling on a motion to quash, a plea in abatement, a
demurrer, or a motion in arrest of judgment; in all other cases the decision
of the supreme court shall determine the law to govern in a similar case."
79 The two judges would deny the power of the Supreme Court to reverse
the trial court on its ruling on a motion to quash, a plea of abatement, a
demurrer, or a motion in arrest of judgment.
6 Kinkade, the seventh judge, did not participate. This decision on the
validity of the criminal advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has prob-
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VIII
Has the Ohio system proved desirable? fruitful enough to
urge upon the Federal government? (i) No doubt the pre-
sumption in favor of constitutionality of a statute has been
strengthened in a positive wayi several judgments have been
upheld on the basis of a statute despite the majority opposition
in the Supreme Court. In this respect, the reform has suc-
ceeded. Maybe that should be the sole criterion of "worth-
whileness."
(2) Procedurally, there has been difficulty. Chief Justice
Marshall"' urged repeal of the amendment on that ground:
* * * it has become apparent that the purposes which were in the
minds of the constitutional convention and of the electorate have not
been served. If it was intended to strengthen the legislative branch of
the government, and relatively weaken the judicial branch, that intent
has likewise failed. While the constitutional provision has taken from
the Supreme Court the power to declare a legislative act to be unconsti-
tutional by a bare majority vote, it has left an unlimited power to do so
in the Court of Appeals. Manifestly, the Constitutional Convention did
not desire to invest more power in the intermediate courts than was
invested in the court of last resort, and yet, in practice, . . . the Court
of Appeals has become the final arbiter of constitutional questions in
many important cases.8 2
William Eggars, in 1931,"3 remarked that the system" . . . in
practice has produced dissatisfaction. . . .7
W. A. Maddox, in 1930, likewise disapproved the Ohio
plan, but his reason appears superficial:
ably been overturned; for seven judges concurred in a dictum in Eastman v.
State of Ohio (Apr. I, 1936), 131 Ohio St. 1, i N.E. 2nd 14o that the
advisory system violates Art. IV, Sec. 6 of the Constitution.
I"1n Board of Education v. Columbus (1928), 118 Ohio St. 295, 16o
N.E. 902.
82 Inlike vein, Carl Meier [(931) 5 U. of Cinn. L. R. at 310] wrote:
"Should the voters of Ohio decide in 1932 to call a convention for the revision
of the present Constitution, it is submitted that the amendment to Article IV,
section 2 . . . should be speedily removed."
83 In "Influence of the Non-Participating Judge," 5 U. of Cinn. L. R.
375, at 376.
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Litigants, in place of finding a uniform law throughout the state,
may find a law applicable in one jurisdiction while it is void in another.
Certainly this is not an end to be desired."4
But the voters have not chosen to repeal the restriction. So
that Ohio judges must either resign themselves to the proced-
ural web they have spun themselves into, or alter their court
procedure to make the amendment more workable. In 1930,
Harvey Walker"5 suggested an amendment to require "an
identical majority, in constitutional cases, to affirm a judgment
of the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional." Is
there enough enthusiasm to pass such an amendment?
Edwin 0. Stene, in 193 5," approved of the existing voting
restriction and chided the Supreme Court members for their
failure to adapt themselves to the novel regulation. One of his
proposed improvements was a constitutional amendment to deny
to the lower courts any power to pass on the constitutionality
of a law."
My own view is to recognize the impracticability of an
amendment, and to alter the court practice (by self-imposed
rules of procedure) so as to harmonize Art. IV, Sec. 2 with the
dominant purposes of the Convention of 1912. To my belief,
those purposes were: (a) to give each litigant one trial, one
final review; (b) as far as possible, each Court of Appeals
should be the highest interpreter of the law for its appellate
district; (c) the Supreme Court should not overturn the opinion
of a Court of Appeals on a constitutional decision unless the
decision is dearly mistaken; and (d) to enhance the presump-
tion in favor of the validity of a statute.
" "Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio," 24 American Political
Science Review 638.
" Then Asst. Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; "Need
for Constitutional Revision in Ohio," 4 U. of Cinn. L. R. 339, at 348.
8' Then Asst. Professor of Political Science, University of Kansas; "Is
There Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio?" 9 U. of Cinn. L. R.
23.
7 How could this amendment meet the test of the Akron Metropolitan
Park District case, supra p. 27?
8I am not unaware that the popular pressure of the day was to "ham-
string" the reactionary Supreme Court.
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In the light of these principles, the trial judge should follow
the constitutional rulings of his own Court of Appeals; only
when at least six of the Supreme Court justices agree in a
holding as to the invalidity of a statute should the trial judge
be permitted to disregard the ruling of his Court of Appeals."
If his Court of Appeals has not ruled on the issue, the trial
judge should make an independent judgment on the validity
of the act, regardless of what five of the Supreme Court justices
may have said.9" (As to the inconsistencies arising from the
privilege of a litigant to bring original mandamus in either a
lower court or in the Supreme Court, I have found no tenable
solution.) " ' At least, there would be a regularized procedure
raised from the present chaos.
Would the same procedural difficulties spring from the plan
to limit the United States Supreme Court to declare laws uncon-
stitutional only by six-to-three decisions? The Hon. Robert
Blair-Smith " believes the same difficulties of the Ohio Amend-
ment would arise under the proposal to restrict the United
States Courts:
Although an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
might be phrased differently [from the -Ohio provision], I think the
same difficulty would arise. For instance, if it were provided that the
court could not declare a law unconstitutional except by a 6-3 vote, and
the judges voted 5-4 to affirm a judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals holding the law unconstitutional, would the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals be reversed by the vote of one minority judge
in the Supreme Court, or would it stand unreversed?
" This is the view taken by Judge Bell in Michaelson v. Cincinnati
(928), z7 O.N.P. (N.S.) ioo. I disapprove the stand of Judge Darby in
Ohio v. Crawford (I9z7), z6 O.N.P. (N.S.) 519.
90 Local conditions may have a peculiar effect on the "reasonableness" of
the law. Of course, the trial judge would be bound by the holding of six or
seven members of the Supreme Court. Caveat, the United States Supreme
Court has never ruled whether a State statute, applied in one district and
voided in another, is consistent with due process.
91 It has been suggested that this be retained as one of the few remaining
tools for the clever pleading lawyer.
92 Of Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Webb, 15 Broad Street, New York City;
he is one of a Committee on Federal Legislation of the local Bar Association.
His views are contained in a letter to Cloyd Laporte, of Root, Clark, Buckner
& Ballantine, 3 Nassau Street, New York City, dated Oct. 7, 1937-
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NORTH DAKOTA
By an amendment in 1919, the Constitution of North
Dakota, Art. IV, Sec. 89, provides:
The supreme court shall consist of five judges; ... provided,
however, that in no case shall any legislative enactment or law of the
state of North Dakota be declared unconstitutional unless at least four
of the judges shall so decide."
The open terms of this amendment reveal two differences
in procedure from the Ohio provision. (I) The North Dakota
amendment limits the voting power of the Supreme Court only
as to "any legislative enactment or law of the state of North
Dakota." The North Dakota Court can declare an Indiana
statute void without restriction. On the other hand, the Ohio
Constitution--"No law shall be held . . . void"--does not
distinguish between an Ohio and an Indiana statute."
(2) More important, unlike the Ohio provision, the North
Dakota amendment does not expressly permit the Supreme
Court to affirm, by a bare majority vote, the decision of a dis-
trict court holding a North Dakota statute invalid. Rather, if a
district court has rested its decision on the sole ground that a
state statute is invalid, must the North Dakota Supreme Court
reverse the judgment unless four of the five judges concur in
affirming the court below?
The latter problem was settled in Daly v. Beery, Auditor
(April 2o, 1920), 45 N.D. 287, 178 N.W. 104, the first case
involving a minority decision. The District Court of Grant
County had held Ch. 188 of the laws of 1919 unconstitutional
(despite the fact that this act had been approved, a few months
previously, by a popular referendum). Only four Supreme
Court justices heard the appeal, and divided, two-to-two, which
normally would have resulted in an affirmance of the court
below. Yet the Supreme Court reversed the decision and up-
9a The North Dakota Supreme Court comprises five members.
'4 I know of no case where the Ohio Supreme Court has held itself
restricted in ruling on the validity of a foreign statute.
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held the statute because four judges had not concurred in voting
to annul the act. The result, which would have been contrary
in Ohio, insured a uniformity of operation of the statute
throughout the State.95
In State, ex rel. Sathre v. Board University Lands (June
29, 1935), 65 N.D. .687, 262 N.W. 6o, the District Court of
Burleigh County had declared a special tax election act consti-
tutional. On appeal, only two of the five justices of the Su-
preme Court believed the act constitutional; yet these two votes
constituted a "majority" sufficient to affirm the judgment
below."8
I have no instance where a North Dakota trial court has
refused to be bound by a "minority" decision of the Supreme
Court.
NEBRASKA
The Nebraska Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 2, as amended in
1920, provides: "No legislative act shall be held unconstitu-
tional except by the concurrence of five judges." The Supreme
Court comprises seven judges.
Since there have been no minority court decisions in
Nebraska,"7 it is not known whether Nebraska will follow the
procedural steps of Ohio or of North Dakota.98
95 The procedure adopted in the Beery case was followed in Wilsoln v.
City of Fargo (Oct. 3, 192), 48 N.D. 447, 186 N.W. 263. The District
Court of Cass County had voided a special election law. The Supreme Court
voted three-to-two to affirm the invalidity of the act; nevertheless, the decision
of the court below was reversed because of the failure of concurrence of four
judges that the law was unconstitutional.
° The North Dakota judges have received the restriction with more
equanimity than their Ohio brothers. The opinion of Justice Robinson is
typical (in Daly v. Beery, 45 N.D. at 3o6): "A recent amendment to the
Constitution indicates the people have come to learn that judges are not
infallible, and it is well to limit the power to annul even an act of the legis-
lature. . . . If the court have the power, by any majority, to hold void an
act submitted to and approved by the people, the power is too dangerous and
arrogant for use, except on occasions very extraordinary."
'7 Accord: Fite and Rubenstein (1937) 35 Mich. L. R. 780.
98 In 1913 the Colorado Constitution was amended to set up two variant
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checks on the judiciary-to deprive the trial courts of power to void laws, and
to provide popular recall of judicial decisions:
[Art. VI, Sec. i (Effective Jan. zz, 1913)]. None of said courts, except the supreme
court, shall have any power to declare or adjudicate any law of this state or any city
charter or amendment thereto . . . as in violation of the Constitution of this state or of
the United States.
[Sec. 2]. All such laws or parts thereof submitted as herein provided when approved
by a majority of the votes cast thereon at such election shall be and become the law of this
state notwithstanding the decision of the supreme court.
The restrictions were nullified by the Colorado Supreme Court in People
v. TVestern Union Telegraph Co. (Apr. 4, 1921), 70 Co1. 90, 198 P. 146
and People v. Max (Apr. 4, 1921), 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. i5o. According to
Justice Burke: "There is no sovereignty in a state to set at naught the Consti-
tution of the Union and no power in its people to command their courts to
do so. That issue was finally settled at Appomattox." Cf. 15 A.L.R. 326,
"Validity and Effect of Provisions Limiting the Power of Courts to Declare
a Statute Unconstitutional."
